The three anglers – one aged over 60 and two aged over 70 – were out on a chartered Dolmøy 230 Fisker pleasure boat (built in 2015). The fishing and charter boat, just under seven metres long, is designed for coastal waters, but only up to CE Category C wind and sea conditions. Specifically, this means average wind speeds of up to 13.8 m/s and significant wave heights of up to 2 metres.
According to the report, on the day of the accident, wave conditions were slightly above this classification. The Norwegian investigators believe that the boat was initially sailing without incident, but then slowly began to take on water from the stern. It is thought that seawater entered through drainage openings in the stern that were positioned too low and did not comply with standards, due to heavy seas.
At the same time, water was able to splash onto the aft deck via a lowered access step. Furthermore, a hatch to the hold proved to be practically watertight – seals were missing, and fastenings were damaged. From the hold, the water entered the cavities between the hull and the interior fittings. This process presumably went unnoticed by the crew at first. The boat continued on its way, but its buoyancy gradually decreased. Consequently, the draught increased, and the stern presumably began to trim downwards more and more.
According to the authorities, this led to a gradual deterioration in the boat’s stability – until it finally capsized in the continuing rough seas.
No distress call was made. Apart from mobile phones, there were no radio equipment or emergency radio beacons or transmitters on board. Investigators believe that the three anglers noticed the water ingress too late. And when they did notice it and apparently switched on a bilge pump – the pump did not have an automatic mechanism to switch itself on – it was no longer able to cope with the incoming water.
Around six hours passed between the presumed capsizing shortly before midday and the chance discovery of the capsized boat; the first of the victims was found around eight hours after the accident, the second a few hours later, and the third not until the following day. All are believed to have drowned as a result of hypothermia. Only one of the men was found wearing a life jacket.
What the investigators found out
The report identifies several key contributing and associated factors:
- Design defects in the Dolmøy 230 Fisker boat model: This same type of boat had already come to attention in previous, similar accidents. Breaches of ISO requirements regarding drainage openings, freeboard, watertightness of hatches, drainage systems and stability were identified. There had even been a temporary ban on imports and sales, coupled with retrofitting requirements. In the case under investigation, it became apparent that significant weaknesses remained and that, contrary to the manufacturer’s claims, the required retrofits had apparently not been carried out.
- A slow leak rather than a sudden burst: The boat was not lost as a result of a spectacular incident, but due to a suspected prolonged ingress of water that went unnoticed. The water spread into cavities throughout the boat’s floor structure, so it would probably not have been noticeable even with a cursory glance into the hold. Such a scenario is extremely dangerous for recreational boaters, as the boat initially ‘just runs a little sluggishly’.
- Lack of emergency equipment: There were no EPIRBs or PLBs (emergency radio beacons with satellite alerts) on board. Nor was there a permanently installed radio. According to the report, the chances of survival would have been significantly higher with suitable tracking and warning systems. The rental company did not have a tracking system either; as a result, it went unnoticed that the boat had left the agreed sailing area and had been drifting motionless for hours.
- Regulatory gaps in the charter sector: Between 2017 and 2025, a total of eleven fatal accidents involving motorboats hired by fishing tourists were recorded in Norway, resulting in 15 deaths – all of whom were foreign visitors. To date, there are hardly any specific requirements for such charter boats regarding technical safety, tracking and additional rescue equipment. Furthermore, the supervision of boats and rental companies is spread across various agencies, which makes monitoring difficult.
The accident was therefore not the result of a single serious error, but of a chain of events: a boat of questionable design, rough conditions exceeding the CE category, a lack of technical rescue equipment, and a rental system without effective safety measures.
What is set to change in the future
The Accident Investigation Board addresses its recommendations to the relevant Norwegian government departments and regulatory bodies, but also aims indirectly to improve safety for recreational boaters. The key points are:
- A dedicated legal framework for recreational boat hire: In future, charter operators are to be monitored in accordance with industry-specific rules, with clear obligations regarding safety management, internal controls and documentation.
- Consolidating technical supervision: Technical supervision of boats and their suitability as charter vessels should be assigned to a specialist maritime authority in order to avoid overlapping responsibilities.
- Taking unsafe boats off the water: In particular, Dolmøy 230 Fisker boats built between 2010 and 2016 that do not comply with the relevant standards should be systematically withdrawn from charter operations as dangerous products.
- Mandatory tracking and warning systems: Charter boats should be fitted with appropriate systems, such as tracking devices and satellite-based emergency locator beacons. This would enable charter companies to detect if boats leave the agreed area or remain inactive for an unusually long period, and to raise the alarm at an early stage in the event of an emergency.
What skippers can learn from this
Private motorboat owners can draw several practical lessons from the report: Anyone chartering a boat should not simply rely on the information in the brochure, but should ask critical questions: What safety equipment is on board? Are there EPIRBs, PLBs or at least a VHF radio? Is the boat’s position monitored by the charter company? A quick check of scuppers, hatches and the general ‘water management’ on board can provide an indication of the technical condition – particularly with older or heavily used charter boats.
Secondly, it is worth considering the limits of the CE category. Sea conditions ‘one notch higher’ may seem manageable at first glance, but can place a significant strain on the boat’s structure, bilge systems and stability under certain circumstances. Anyone who notices that the stern and cockpit are dipping below the waterline more frequently than planned should cut the trip short at an early stage and seek shelter – not only once water has already entered the boat.
Thirdly, this case highlights just how crucial it is to have redundant emergency communication systems. Mobile phones can quickly fail in the event of a capsize, in cold weather or where reception is poor. Simple, now affordable PLBs or AIS emergency transponders greatly increase the chances of being found.
Ultimately, the accident serves as a reminder that even what is essentially a harmless day’s fishing off the coast is a voyage that must be taken seriously. By briefing your crew, ensuring life jackets are worn at all times, discussing emergency procedures and making conscious use of the equipment on board, you reduce the risk of finding yourself in a life-threatening emergency should an accident occur.
Pascal Schürmann
Editor YACHT
